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Abstract—Privacy-preserving average consensus aims to guar-
antee the privacy of initial states and asymptotic consensus on
the exact average of the initial value. In existing work, it is
achieved by adding and subtracting variance decaying and zero-
sum random noises to the consensus process. However, there
is lack of theoretical analysis to quantify the degree of the
privacy protection. In this paper, we introduce the maximum
disclosure probability that the other nodes can infer one node’s
initial state within a given small interval to quantify the pri-
vacy. We develop a novel privacy definition, named (, δ)-data-
privacy, to depict the relationship between maximum disclosure
probability and estimation accuracy. Then, we prove that the
general privacy-preserving average consensus (GPAC) provides
(, δ)-data-privacy, and provide the closed-form expression of
the relationship between  and δ. Meanwhile, it is shown that
the added noise with uniform distribution is optimal in terms
of achieving the highest (, δ)-data-privacy. We also prove that
when all information used in the consensus process is available,
the privacy will be compromised. Finally, an optimal privacy-
preserving average consensus (OPAC) algorithm is proposed to
achieve the highest (, δ)-data-privacy and avoid the privacy
compromission. Simulations are conducted to verify the results.
Index Terms—Average consensus, Data privacy, Optimal algo-
rithm, Disclosure probability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consensus has attracted extensive attention over the past
decades, since it is an efficient algorithm for distributed com-
puting and control. A consensus algorithm refers to the action
that nodes in the network reach a global agreement regarding a
certain opinion using their local neighbors’ information only
[1]. Due to the strong robustness and scalability, consensus
has been applied in a variety of areas, e.g., coordination and
cooperation [2], [3], distributed estimation and optimization
[4], [5], sensor fusion [6], distributed energy management [7]
and sensing scheduling [8], and time synchronization [9]–[11].
Average consensus is the most commonly adopted consen-
sus algorithm, where the agreement reached by the algorithm
equals the average of all nodes’ initial states. For traditional
average consensus algorithms, each node will broadcast its
real state to neighbor nodes during consensus process. Hence,
under traditional average consensus algorithms, the state in-
formation of each node is disclosed to its neighbor nodes.
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However, in some applications, the initial states of nodes are
private information, which means that nodes do not want to
release their real initial states to other nodes [16]. For example,
consensus algorithm is adopted in social networks for a group
of members to compute the common opinion on a subject
[17]. In this application, each member may want to keep his
personal opinion on the subject secret to other members. Also,
in the multi-agent rendezvous problem [18], a group of nodes
want to eventually rendezvous at a certain location, while the
participators may not want to release their initial locations to
others. This means that when the privacy is concerned, each
node’s real state may not be available to the other nodes, and
thus the traditional consensus algorithm becomes invalid.
Recently, researchers have investigated the privacy-
preserving average consensus problem, which aims to guaran-
tee that the privacy of initial state is preserved while average
consensus can still be achieved [12]–[16]. The basic idea is to
add random noise to the real state value during the commu-
nication to protect the privacy, and then carefully design the
noise adding process such that average consensus is achieved.
For example, Huang et al. [13] designed a differentially private
iterative synchronous consensus algorithm by adding inde-
pendent and exponentially decaying Laplacian noises to the
consensus process. Their algorithm can guarantee differential
privacy. As the algorithm may converge to a random value,
the exact average consensus may not be guaranteed. Nozari et
al. [14] pointed out and proved that it is impossible to achieve
average consensus and differential privacy simultaneously.
Hence, they design a novel linear Laplacian-based consensus
algorithm, which guarantees that an unbiased estimate of
the average consensus can be achieved almost surely with
differential privacy. Manitara and Hadjicostis [15] proposed
a privacy preserving average consensus algorithm by adding
correlated noises to the consensus process. The proposed
algorithm guarantees the initial state of each node cannot be
perfectly inferred by the other “malicious” nodes. A sufficient
condition is provided under which the privacy of benign
agents’ initial states are preserved. More recently, Mo and
Murray in [16] well addressed the privacy-preserving average
consensus problem by designing a novel PPAC algorithm,
where exponentially decaying and zero-sum normal noises
are added to traditional consensus process. They proved that
PPAC algorithm achieves the exact average consensus in
the mean-square sense, and also proved that the algorithm
achieves minimum privacy breach in the sense of disclosed
space. Braca et al. in [22] examined the interplay between
learning and privacy over multi-agent consensus networks.
They provided an analytical characterization of the interplay
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2between learning and privacy for the consensus perturbing and
preserving strategy, respectively.
However, there is lack of theoretical results to quantify the
degree of the privacy protection and what is the relationship
between the estimation accuracy and privacy. To fill this gap,
in this paper, we provide theoretical privacy analysis for the
GPAC algorithm (consider the general noise adding process)
in the sense of the maximum disclosure probability that other
nodes can infer one node’s initial state within a given small
interval (a given estimation accuracy). A privacy definition,
named (, δ)-data-privacy, which is first introduced in our
previous work [21], is exploited to depict the maximum disclo-
sure probability. This privacy definition reveals the relationship
between privacy and estimation accuracy. We provide theoret-
ical results to quantify the degree of the privacy preservation
and demonstrate the quantitative relationship of the estimation
accuracy and the privacy under the GPAC algorithm. Based on
the analysis, it is found that the noise with uniform distribution
is the optimal one in terms of achieving the highest (, δ)-
data-privacy, and the exact initial state of a node can be
perfectly inferred, i.e., privacy is compromised, when a node
has all information used in the consensus process. Hence, to
solve this problem, we design a novel OPAC algorithm to
achieve average consensus as well as data-privacy. The main
contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
• We prove that the GPAC algorithm provides (, δ)-data-
privacy, and obtain a closed-form expression of the
relationship between the estimation accuracy and the
privacy (the relationship between  and δ).
• We prove that for the added random noises, the uniform
distribution is optimal in the sense that a PPAC algorithm
can achieve the highest privacy when the mean and
variance of noises are fixed.
• We prove that when all the information used in the
consensus process are available for the estimation, the
maximum disclosure probability will converge to one,
i.e., the initial state of a node is perfectly inferred. This
result reveals how the exact initial state can be inferred.
• We design a novel OPAC algorithm to achieve aver-
age consensus while guarantees the highest (, δ)-data-
privacy. It is proved that OPAC algorithm converges to
the exact average consensus, and avoids the privacy to
be lost even if all the information used in the consensus
process is available for the estimation.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II introduces preliminary results and problem formulation. In
Section III, we provide theoretical results on the degree of
privacy pretection. The OPAC algorithm is proposed in Section
IV. Section V verifies the main results and conclusions are
given in Section VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
The network is abstracted as an undirected and connected
graph, G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E is
the set of the communication links (edges) between nodes.
(i, j) ∈ E if and only if (iff) nodes i and j can communicate
with each other. Let Ni be the neighbor set of node i, where
j ∈ Ni iff (i, j) ∈ E, i.e., Ni = {j|j ∈ V, (i, j) ∈ E, j 6= i}.
A. Average Consensus
Suppose that there are n (n ≥ 3) nodes in the network
(i.e., |V | = n), and each node i has an initial scalar state
xi(0), where xi(0) ∈ R. For an average consensus algorithm,
each node will communicate with its neighbor nodes and
update its state based on the received information to obtain
the average of all initial state’s values. Hence, the traditional
average consensus algorithm is given as follows,
xi(k + 1) = wiixi(k) +
∑
j∈Ni
wijxj(k), (1)
for ∀i ∈ V , which can be written in the matrix form as
x(k + 1) = Wx(k), (2)
where wii and wij are weights, and W is the weight matrix.
It is well known from [19] that if, 1) wii > 0, and wij > 0 for
(i, j) ∈ E and wij = 0 for otherwise; and 2) W is a doubly
stochastic matrix, then average consensus can be achieved by
(1), i.e.,
lim
k→∞
xi(k) =
∑n
`=1 x`(0)
n
= x¯. (3)
When the privacy of nodes’ initial states are concerned, all
nodes are unwilling to release its real state to the neighbor
nodes at each iteration. It means that each xj(k) is unavailable
in (1). To preserve the privacy of nodes’ initial states, a widely
used approach is to add a random noise to the real state value
when a node needs to communicate with its neighbor nodes
at each iteration. We define a new state as
x+i (k) = xi(k) + θi(k), i ∈ V, (4)
where θi(k) is the added random noise for privacy preservation
at iteration k. With the noise adding process, the update
equation (1) is changed to,
xi(k + 1) = wiix
+
i (k) +
∑
j∈Ni
wijx
+
j (k) (5)
= wii[xi(k) + θi(k)] +
∑
j∈Ni
wij [xj(k) + θj(k)], (6)
for ∀i ∈ V . Therefore, a privacy-preserving average consen-
sus algorithm is to design the added noises (including the
distribution and the correlations among them), such that the
goal of (1) is achieved under (5). Note that in (4), the noise
θi(k) is a general random noise (where its distribution is not
fixed), the algorithm (4)–(6) is thus named as the general
privacy-preserving average consensus (GPAC) algorithm in the
remainder part of this paper.
B. Privacy Definitions
Under (4), the broadcast information sequence of node i is
x+i (0), x
+
i (1), ..., x
+
i (k), which will be received by its neigh-
bor nodes. Hence, each neighbor node j can infer/estimate
the initial state xi(0) with the received information sequence
from node i. Note that each of the information output, x+i (k),
equals the weighted sum of the received information in the
previous round plus a noise. Based on the information output,
node j will take the probability over the space of all noises
3{θi(k)}∞k=0 (where the space is denoted by Θ) to estimate
the values of the added noises. It then will infer xi(0) by
using the difference between each information output and the
estimated noises, i.e., xˆi(0) = x+i (k) − θˆi(k), where θˆi(k)
is the estimation of random noise θki (θ
k
i = x
+
i (k) − xi(0)).
Under this estimation, we have
Pr {|xˆi(0)− xi(0)| ≤ } = Pr
{
|θˆi(k)− θki | ≤ 
}
, (7)
where  ≥ 0 is a small constant.
To investigate the relationship between the estimation accu-
racy and privacy, by referring to [21], we then introduce an
privacy definition, named (, δ)-data-privacy, where 0 ≤  and
0 ≤ δ ≤ 1, as follows.
Definition 2.1: A GPAC algorithm provides (, δ)-data-
privacy, if and only if (iff),
δ = max
θˆi(k)∈Θ,k≥0
Pr{|θˆi(k)− θki | ≤ }, (8)
where θki = x
+
i (k)− xi(0) and θˆi(k) is the estimation of θki .
In the above definition, the estimation accuracy is denoted
by parameter  and the privacy is expressed by parameter δ.
From (8), it follows that δ is the maximum probability that
each neighbor node j can successfully estimate the initial
state xi(0) in a given interval [xi(0) − , xi(0) + ] with the
information output of node i only. δ is thus named as the
maximum disclosure probability.
Definition 2.2: Given an , if algorithms A1 and A2 pro-
vide (, δ1)-data-privacy and (, δ2)-data-privacy, respectively,
where δ1 < δ2, then we say that A1 achieves a higher (, δ)-
data-privacy than A2.
C. Problem Formulation
In this paper, we will investigate the privacy of the GPAC
algorithm (4)–(6) based on the definition of (, δ)-data-privacy,
and then design an optimal privacy-preserving average consen-
sus (OPAC) algorithm in terms of (, δ)-data-privacy protec-
tion. In summary, we will consider the following four critical
problems: i) how to quantify and analyze the privacy of the
GPAC algorithm; ii) how will the distribution and correlation
of the added random noises affect the privacy; iii) when and
how will a node’s exact initial state be inferred by the other
nodes; iv) how to achieve the optimal (, δ)-data-privacy and
the exact average consensus, and avoid the privacy of nodes’
initial states to be lost.
III. PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF GPAC
Before presenting the main results, we first give the basic
assumptions and the information set used for state estimation.
Assume that the distribution and the correlation of the random
variable θi(k), k = 0, 1, ..., and the update rule of the GPAC
algorithm are available to all nodes. The full topology infor-
mation and n are assumed to be unknown to any node, which
means that each node cannot know the neighbor set of its
neighbor nodes and the number of nodes in the whole network.
The initial states of nodes are assumed to be independent
from each other. For estimation, if there is no information
of a variable, then the variable is viewed with domain R. For
simplicity, we assume that θi(k) and θj(k) are independently
and identically distributed (i.i.d) ∀k ≥ 0 and i 6= j. Let X be
the output of a random variable whose distribution is unknown
and with domain R. Without the knowledge of the distribution,
according to the principle of maximum entropy, we should
take the same probability over all the possible values of the
random variable to estimate the values of X . Therefore, given
an estimation Xˆ , it is reasonable to assume that
Pr{|Xˆ −X| ≤ }  max
ν∈Θ
∫ ν+
ν−
fθi(0)(y)dy. (9)
Then, we define two information sets of node i up to
iteration k as follows,
I0i (k) = {x+i (0), ..., x+i (k)}, (10)
and
I1i (k) ={Ni, wii, wij , x+i (0), x+j (0),
..., x+i (k), x
+
j (k)|j ∈ Ni}. (11)
The information set I0i (k) only includes the states x+i (`), ` =
0, 1, ..., k, which are used for communication at iteration `.
Thus, its neighbor nodes can easily obtain I0i (k) by storing
the information received from node i at each iteration. The
information set I1i (k) includes all information used in con-
sensus process (6) for node i. Other nodes may obtain these
information by an eavesdropping attack.
A. Privacy of the Algorithm
In this subsection, based on the definition of (, δ)-data-
privacy, we first analyze the privacy of the GPAC algorithm
and reveal the relationship between the privacy and estimation
accuracy, when I0i (k) is available only.
Theorem 3.1: If I0i (k) is the only information available to
node j to estimate the value of xi(0) at iteration k, then
δ(k) = max
θˆi(k)∈Θ,k∈N+
Pr{|θˆi(k)− θki | ≤ |I0i (k)}
= max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
Pr{|θˆi(0)− θ0i | ≤ |I0i (0)} (12)
= max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)(y)dy, (13)
i.e., the relationship between the privacy and the estimation
accuracy always satisfies (13), and the maximum disclosure
probability is not increased with iteration.
Proof: We first prove that, under I0i (0), (13) holds. With
I0i (0), node j can estimate xi(0) based on the fact that
x+i (0) = xi(0) + θi(0) = xi(0) + θ
0
i , (14)
and the corresponding estimation xˆi(0) satisfies
xˆi(0) = x
+
i (0)− θˆi(0). (15)
4Then, for any estimation θˆi(0), we have
Pr
{
|θˆi(0)− θ0i | ≤ |I0i (0)
}
= Pr
{
θi(0) ∈ [θˆi(0)− , θˆi(0) + ]|I0i (0)
}
=
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)|I0
i
(0)
(y)dy
≤ max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)(y)dy, (16)
which means that (13) holds under information I0i (0) at
iteration k = 0.
Then, we prove that (13) holds under I0i (1). With I0i (1),
node j can estimate xi(0) by using the fact of both (14) and
the following equation for estimation,
x+i (1)
wii
=
xi(1) + θi(1)
wii
=x+i (0) +
∑
l∈Ni
wil
wii
x+l (0) +
1
wii
θi(1)
=xi(0) + θi(0) +
1
wii
θi(1) +
∑
l∈Ni
wil
wii
x+l (0). (17)
Using (14) only, we have
Pr
{
|θˆi(0)− θ0i | ≤ |I0i (1)
}
=
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)|I0
i
(1)
(y)dy
≤ max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)(y)dy. (18)
Then, we consider the estimation using (17) only. Let
θ1i = θi(0) +
1
wii
θi(1) +
∑
l∈Ni
wil
wii
x+l (0)
= θi(0) +
1
wii
θi(1) + θ
1
i (1)
= θ1i (0) + θ
1
i (1). (19)
For any estimation θˆi(1) (the estimation of θ1i ), we have
Pr
{
|θˆi(1)− θ1i | ≤ |I0i (1)
}
≤Pr
{
|θ1i − θˆi(1)| ≤ |I0i (1),wii,θi(1),θi(0)
}
≤Pr
{
|θ1i − θ1i (0)− θˆi(1) + θ1i (0)| ≤ |I0i (1),wii,θ1i (0)
}
≤Pr
{
|θ1i (1)− θˆ1i (1)| ≤ |I0i (1),wii
}
, (20)
where θˆ1i (1) = θˆi(1) − θ1i (0) can be viewed as one of the
estimation of θ1i (1). Since the initial states of nodes are
independent from each other and the topology information
is not available for estimating/inferring, there is at least one
variable included in θ1i (1) which is unknown to the other
nodes. Hence, θ1i (1) is viewed as a random variable in (20)
and its distribution is not available to the estimation. It follows
that
Pr
{
|θˆi(1)− θ1i | ≤ |I0i (1)
}
≤Pr
{
|θ1i (1)− θˆ1i (1)| ≤ |I0i (1),wii
}
≤max
z∈Θ
∫ z+
z−
fθi(0)(y)dy, (21)
where we have used the assumption (9). Meanwhile, note that
one node can combine (14) and (17) together for estimation.
In this case, we have
Pr{xˆi(0) ∈ [xi(0)− , xi(0) + ]|I0i (1)}
≤ max
t1,t2∈Θ
∫ t1+
t1−
∫ t2+
t2−
fθ0i ,θ1i (y, z)dzdy
≤ max
t1,t2∈Θ
∫ t1+
t1−
∫ t2+
t2−
fθ1i |θ0i (z|y)fθ0i (y)dzdy
≤max
t∈Θ
∫ t+
t−
fθi(0)(y)dy. (22)
From (18), (21) and (22), one concludes that (13) holds under
information I0i (1) at iteration k = 1.
Following the similar analysis, we can prove that (13) holds
under information set I0i (k) at any iteration k. It means that
δ(k) is not an increased function of iteration k, although there
are more information of I0i (k) than I0i (0) for k > 0.
We thus have completed the proof.
From the above proof, it is observed that the privacy is not
decreased with iteration when only the information set I0i (=
{I0i (k)|k = 0, 1, ...,∞}) is available for estimation. The main
reason is that based on I0i , node j cannot know the neighbor
set information of node i, so that after one iteration there are
unknown information embedded into x+i (k) for k ≥ 1. Hence,
after one iteration, using x+i (k) for k ≥ 1 cannot improve the
estimation accuracy. Also, one can see that the value of δ does
not depend on the estimation approaches. Hence, we state the
following theorem.
Theorem 3.2: If I0i is the only information available to the
other nodes to estimate the value of xi(0), the GPAC algorithm
achieves (, δ)-data-privacy, where  and δ satisfy
δ = max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)(y)dy (23)
and lim→0 δ = 0.
Remark 3.3: It should be noticed that the results in the
above two theorems are obtained under the assumption that
the topology information is unknown to the nodes. If the
assumption is relaxed, the above results could not be true
for the GPAC algorithm in some cases. For example, if the
topology information is available and Ni ⊆ Nj , then x+i (0)
and
∑
l∈Ni
wil
wii
x+l (0) =
wij
wii
x+j (0) in (17) are available to
node j. It leads to that the value of θi(1) is released, which
may decrease the uncertainty of θi(0) due to the correlation
between them. Then, fθi(0)|I0
i
(1)
(y) in (18) will have a smaller
variance than fθi(0)(y), such that δ increases w.r.t. k in this
case. Therefore, (12) and (13) are no longer guaranteed.
From the above theorem, one sees that δ depends only on
fθi(0)(y) and  since the estimation θˆi(0) can be any value in
5the domain of θi(0). Thus, δ is a function of fθi(0)(y) and ,
i.e, δ = δ(fθi(0)(y), ). Based on Definition 2.2, a smaller δ
can provide a higher (, δ)-data-privacy for any given . Then,
we aim to find the optimal distribution for θi(0) such that the
algorithm can achieve the highest (, δ)-data-privacy.
B. Optimal Noise Distribution
In this subsection, we find an optimal distribution for the
noise adding process in the sense of achieving the highest
(, δ)-data-privacy for the GPAC algorithm. Note that a smaller
 means a higher accuracy estimation. It means that when 
becomes smaller, the value of δ is more important for the
privacy preservation. Hence, we define the optimal distribution
for privacy concerns as follows.
Definition 3.4: Let f∗θi(0)(y) be the optimal distribution of
θi(0), it means that for any given distribution f1θi(0)(y), there
exists an 1 such that δ(f∗θi(0)(y), ) < δ(f
1
θi(0)
(y), ) holds
for ∀ ∈ (0, 1].
To obtain the optimal distribution described in Definition
3.4, we define arg minfθi(0)(y) δ = f
∗
θi(0)
(y). Then, we for-
mulate the following minimization problem,
min
fθi(0)(y)
δ
s.t. E{θi(0)} = 0,
Var{θi(0)} = σ2.
(24)
The solution of (24) is the optimal distribution for the added
noises with a given mean and variance in terms of (, δ)-data-
privacy for the GPAC algorithm.
Theorem 3.5: If I0i is the only information available to node
j to estimate the value of xi(0), then the optimal solution of
problem (24) is that
f∗θi(0)(y) =

1
2
√
3σ
, if y ∈ [−
√
3σ,
√
3σ],
0, otherwise,
(25)
i.e., given the finite variance, the uniform distribution is
optimal.
Proof: We prove this theorem by contradiction. Without
loss of generality, we assume that σ2 = 13 . Let f1(y) and
f2(y) be the PDF of two random variables with mean 0 and
variance σ2 = 13 , and they follow a uniform and non-uniform
distribution, respectively. Clearly, we have
f1(y) =

1
2
, if y ∈ [−1, 1],
0, otherwise.
(26)
Suppose that the non-uniform distribution f2(y) is the
optimal distribution. From Definition 3.4, there exists an 2,
such that
max
t∈R
∫ t+
t−
f1(y)dy > max
t∈R
∫ t+
t−
f2(y)dy, (27)
holds for ∀ ∈ (0, 2]. Since the above equation holds for
arbitrarily small value of , we infer that
max
y∈R
f1(y) > max
y∈R
f2(y).
Since f1(y) is a uniform distribution satisfying (26),
f1(y)− f2(y) > 0, y ∈ [−1, 1].
It directly follows that∫ 1
−1
f1(y)dy −
∫ 1
−1
f2(y)dy > 0. (28)
From the definition of a PDF, we have
∫ 1
−1 f1(y)dy = 1. Then,
we infer from (28) that∫ 1
−1
f2(y)dy < 1. (29)
Since both f1(y) and f2(y) have mean 0 and variance σ2 =
1
3 , we have∫ +∞
−∞
f1(y)y
2dy −
∫ ∞
−∞
f2(y)y
2dy = 0, (30)
which means that∫ 1
−1
(f1(y)− f2(y)) y2dy =
(∫ −1
−∞
+
∫ +∞
1
)
f2(y)y
2dy.
(31)
For the left hand side of (31), we have∫ 1
−1
(f1(y)− f2(y)) y2dy <
∫ 1
−1
(f1(y)− f2(y)) dy
= 1−
∫ 1
−1
f2(y)dy. (32)
For the right hand side of (31), since we have
∫ +∞
−∞ f2(y)dy =
1 and (29), it holds that(∫ −1
−∞
+
∫ +∞
1
)
f2(y)y
2dy >
(∫ −1
−∞
+
∫ +∞
1
)
f2(y)dy
= 1−
∫ 1
−1
f2(y)dy. (33)
Combining (31), (32) and (33) renders a contradiction that
1−
∫ 1
−1
f2(y)dy <
∫ 1
−1
(f1(y)− f2(y)) y2dy
< 1−
∫ 1
−1
f2(y)dy. (34)
Hence, we cannot find a non-uniform distribution f2(y) such
that the value of δ is smaller than that under uniform distribu-
tion f1(y). It means that, given the finite variance, the uniform
distribution is the optimal solution of (24). Then, based on the
definition of uniform distribution, it is not difficult to obtain
(25).
We thus have completed the proof.
We have known that for the existing PPAC algorithm
proposed in [16], the normal distribution noises is used in
the noise adding process. It follows from Theorem 3.2 that
the PPAC algorithm provides (, δ)-data-privacy with
δ =
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ 
−
exp
(
− y
2
2σ2
)
dy.
6If we use the uniform distribution noises to substitute the
normal distribution noises, it can still provide (, δ)-data-
privacy, where δ = √
3σ
. Clearly, given a small  ( σ2),
we have
√
3σ
<
1
σ
√
2pi
∫ 
−
exp
(
− y
2
2σ2
)
dy,
which means that the privacy of PPAC is enhanced.
C. Privacy Compromission
In this subsection, we reveal that for the GPAC algorithm,
when I1i (k) (including more information than I0i (k), e.g.,
the topology information and information used in consensus
process) is available to other nodes for estimation, the exact
initial state of node i can be perfectly inferred, and thus the
privacy of the initial state is compromised.
Theorem 3.6: If the information set I1i (k) of node i is
available to the other nodes for estimation, then
δ(k) ≥ max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)|θi(1),...,θi(k)(y)dy,∀k ≥ 0,
(35)
where fθi(0)|θi(1),...,θi(k)(y) is the conditional PDF of θi(0)
given conditions θi(1), ..., θi(k). Then, if
∑∞
`=0 θi(`) = 0,
we have δ = 1, i.e., xi(0) is disclosed and the privacy is
compromised.
Proof: Based on the information set I1i (k), the informa-
tion of weights and states used in (5) is available. That is
the state sequence xi(1), xi(2), ..., xi(k) of node i is released
to other nodes. Then, with (4), one obtains the values of
θi(1), θi(2), ...., θi(k). Thus, when k > 0, all the adding noises
and the states of node i are available to other nodes, except
xi(0) and θi(0).
Then, under information set I1i (k), using (14), we have
Pr
{
|θˆi(0)− θ0i | ≤ |I0i (k)
}
=
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)|I0
i
(k)
(y)dy
=
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)|θi(1),...,θi(k)(y)dy. (36)
According the definition of δ, it follows that
δ(k) ≥ max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
Pr
{
|θˆi(0)− θ0i | ≤ |I0i (k)
}
≥ max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)|θi(1),...,θi(k)(y)dy, (37)
which means that (35) holds.
When
∑∞
`=0 θi(`) = 0, we have
θi(0) = −
∞∑
`=1
θi(`). (38)
Since θi(1), θi(2), ...., θi(k) are available under I1i (k) for
any integer k, θi(0) is inferred with (38) when k → ∞,
i.e., θi(0) is fixed and no longer a random variable given
θi(1), θi(2), ...., θi(∞). It follows that
lim
k→∞
max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)|θi(1),...,θi(k)(y)dy = 1,
which implies that δ = 1. Actually, when both x+i (0) and
θi(0) in (14) are disclosed, xi(0) is disclosed.
We thus have completed the proof.
Consider the existing PPAC algorithms, e.g., [16], [21]. One
obtain the correlation of the added noises satisfies
k∑
`=0
θi(`) = θi(0) +
k∑
`=1
[
%`νi(`)− %`−1νi(`− 1)
]
= νi(0)− %0νi(0) + %1νi(1)− %1νi(1) + %2νi(2)
− ...− %k−1νi(k − 1) + %kνi(k)
= %kνi(k) = φi(k), (39)
where νi(k) is a random variable with fixed mean (= 0)
and variance (= σ2). Given θi(1), ..., θi(k), we obtains that
θi(0) = φi(k) −
∑k
`=1 θi(`), where
∑k
`=1 θi(`) is known.
Then, we have
Pr
{
|θˆi(0)− θi(0)| ≤ |I1i (k)
}
= Pr
{
|φˆi(k)− φi(k)| ≤ 
}
=
∫ φˆi(k)+
φˆi(k)−
fφi(k)(y)dy, (40)
and
max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ θˆi(0)+
θˆi(0)−
fθi(0)|θi(1),...,θi(k)(y)dy
= max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ φˆi(k)+
φˆi(k)−
fφi(k)(y)dy,
which satisfies (35). When k →∞, we have
lim
k→∞
max
θˆi(0)∈Θ
∫ φˆi(k)+
φˆi(k)−
fφi(k)(y)dy = 1,
since the variance of φˆi satisfies limk→∞ %2kσ2 = 0, and thus
δ = 1. Therefore, it further verifies the result given in Theorem
3.6.
D. Further Discussion on Privacy
Differential privacy is a well-known and widely used pri-
vacy concept in computer and communication area [20], and
it has been employed in control and network systems recently
[23]. A differentially private algorithm promises that any two
similar/close inputs will have approximately the same outputs,
so that an adversary cannot infer from the data output with a
high probability whether the data are associated with a single
user or not. It has been proved by Nozari et al. in [14] that
nodes in the network system cannot simultaneously converge
to the average of their initial states and preserve differential
privacy of their initial states. This motivated us to develop the
definition of the (, δ)-data-privacy. The proposed (, δ)-data
privacy can be used to reveal the relationship between the
7the maximum data disclosure probability (δ) under a given
estimation accuracy range ().
Consider the general noise adding mechanism that added
a random noise to the initial data for data publishing. It is
well known that when the adding noise is Laplacian noise,
the mechanism ensures differential privacy, but if the noise
is Gaussian or Uniform distribution, the differential privacy
cannot be guaranteed. Hence, the uniform noise is not good
in the sense of differential privacy. However, in term of
(, δ)-data-privacy, it is shown in this paper that both the
Gaussian and Uniform noise are (, δ)-data-private, and using
the Uniform noise can achieve the highest privacy. Clearly,
the privacy of (, δ)-data-privacy is different from that of
differential privacy. It is worth to investigate the relationship
between these two kinds of privacy definition in theory, which
beckons further investigation.
IV. OPAC ALGORITHM
In this section, we design an OPAC algorithm to achieve
the highest (, δ)-data-privacy, and at the same time to avoid
privacy to be compromised even if the information I1i (∞) of
each node i is available to other nodes.
A. Algorithm Design
From the privacy analysis in the above section, we note
that the uniform distribution is optimal for the added noise
in terms of achieving the highest (, δ)-data-privacy with δ =
√
3σ
(given variance σ). Hence, in each iteration of the OPAC
algorithm, we will use uniform distribution noise. We also
note that privacy is compromised when I1i (∞) is available.
It is because that the nodes can use I1i (∞) to obtain the real
values of θi(1), θi(2), ...., θi(∞), and then use the correlation∑∞
k=0 θi(k) = 0 to infer θi(0), and thus the value of xi(0)
is revealed. To avoid the privacy compromission in this case,
we introduce a secret continuous function Fij(z) : R→ R for
node i with respect to its neighbor node j. Suppose that Fij(z)
and Fji(z) are only available to nodes i and j, and Fij(z)
may or may not equal to Fji(z). Then, the OPAC algorithm
is described as follows.
B. Convergence and Privacy Analysis
In this subsection, we analyze the convergence and the
privacy of the OPAC algorithm.
Theorem 4.1: Using the OPAC algorithm, we have (3) holds
for ∀i ∈ V , i.e., an exact average consensus is achieved.
Proof: From Theorem 4.1 of [21], we know that if the
added noises in (4) are bounded and decaying, and the sum of
all nodes’ added noises equals zero, then average consensus
can be achieved. In the following, we prove that the added
noises used for the OPAC algorithm satisfy these conditions.
We first prove that the added noises are bounded and expo-
nentially decaying. Clearly, θi(0) = νi(0) ∈ [−
√
3σ,
√
3σ] is
bounded. Since each Fij(z) is continuous function, its value
is bounded for any given z. Then, it follows from (41) that
ν˜i(0) is bounded. For k ≥ 1, because νi(k) is selected from
interval [−√3σ,√3σ] and θi(k) is generated by (42), it is not
Algorithm 1 : OPAC Algorithm
1: Initialization: Each node i selects a uniform distribution random
variable νi(0) from interval [−
√
3σ,
√
3σ], and arbitrarily selects
a constant sequence zij (∈ R) for j ∈ Ni.
2: Let θi(0) = νi(0) and x+i (0) = xi(0)+ θi(0). Then, each node
i transmits x+i (0) and zij to its neighbor node j.
3: Each node i calculates ν˜i(0) by
ν˜i(0) = νi(0)−
∑
j∈Ni
[Fij(zij)− Fji(zji)] ,∀i ∈ V. (41)
4: Iteration: Each node updates its state with (5).
5: Each node generates a uniform distribution random variable νi(k)
from interval [−√3σ,√3σ] for k ≥ 1.
6: Each node i uses θi(k) in (4) to get x+i (k), where
θi(k) =
{
%νi(1)− ν˜i(0), if k = 1;
%kνi(k)− %k−1νi(k − 1), if k ≥ 2,
(42)
where % ∈ (0, 1) is a constant for all nodes.
7: Each node i communicates with its neighbors with x+i (k).
8: Let k = k + 1 and go to step 4.
difficult to infer that each θi(k) is bounded. Meanwhile, it
follows from (42) that
lim
k→∞
|θi(k)| ≤ lim
k→∞
|%kνi(k)− %k−1νi(k − 1)|
≤ lim
k→∞
[%k
√
3σ + %k−1
√
3σ] = 0,
which means that the noises are decaying and converge to 0.
Next, we prove that the sum of all nodes’ added noises
equals to zero. Note that
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=0
θi(k) =
n∑
i=1
θi(0) +
n∑
i=1
θi(1)
+
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=2
(%kνi(k)− %k−1νi(k − 1))
=
n∑
i=1
νi(0) +
n∑
i=1
(%νi(1)− ν˜i(0))
+
n∑
i=1
(%∞νi(∞)− %1νi(1))
=
n∑
i=1
νi(0)−
n∑
i=1
ν˜i(0),
where we have used the fact that %∞νi(∞) = 0. Substituting
(41) into the above equation yields that
n∑
i=1
∞∑
k=0
θi(k) =
n∑
i=1
νi(0)
−
n∑
i=1
νi(0)−∑
j∈Ni
(Fij(zij)− Fji(zji))

=
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
[Fji(zji)− Fij(zij)] .
Since for each pair of Fji(zji)−Fij(zij) using in node i, there
exists a pair of Fij(zij)− Fji(zji) with negative value using
8in node j, it follows that
n∑
i=1
∑
j∈Ni
[Fji(zji)− Fij(zij)] = 0.
Hence, we have
∑n
i=1
∑∞
k=0 θi(k) = 0.
Thus, the proof is completed.
The following theorem can be obtained from Theorem 3.2
directly, since OPAC is one of the GPAC algorithm.
Theorem 4.2: If I0i is the only information available to the
other nodes to estimate the value of xi(0), then the OPAC
algorithm achieves (, δ)-data-privacy, where δ = √
3σ
and
lim→0 δ = 0.
Then, the following theorem shows that under I1i , the
privacy compromission can be avoided by OPAC.
Theorem 4.3: Suppose that the information set I1i of node
i is available to the other nodes and each node has at least
two neighbors (i.e., |Ni| ≥ 2 for all i ∈ V ). Then, the privacy
compromission can be avoided by OPAC.
Proof: It has been known that when I1i of node i is
available to other nodes, its neighbor node j can obtain
the real values of θi(1), θi(2), ...., θi(∞). Then, the value of∑∞
k=1 θi(k) is released. Note that
∞∑
k=1
θi(k) = (%
1νi(1)− ν˜i(0)) +
∞∑
k=2
θi(k)
= (%1νi(1)− ν˜i(0)) + (%∞νi(∞)− %1νi(1))
= ν˜i(0).
It means that the value of ν˜i(0) is released and available to
node j. From (41), one sees that ν˜i(0) 6= θi(0)1 and
ν˜i(0) = θi(0)−
∑
j∈Ni
[Fij(zij)− Fji(zji)] . (43)
Since |Ni| ≥ 2 and only Fij and Fji is known to node j, there
exists Fijo(zijo)−Fjoi(zjoi) for j0 ∈ Ni in (43) is not known
by node j. Meanwhile, Fijo(zijo)−Fjoi(zjoi) has domain R,
thus one infers that for any c ∈ [−√3σ,√3σ],
Pr{θi(0) = c|ν˜i(0)} = Pr{θi(0) = c}.
Hence, even if the value of ν˜i(0) is released, node j cannot
increase the estimation accuracy of θi(0) with (43). One thus
concludes that based on the OPAC algorithm, the privacy
compromission is avoided.
We thus have completed the proof.
If node i has only one neighbor node j, node j can infer
the value of Fij(zij)− Fji(zji). Then, from (43), node j can
obtain the value of θi(0) and xi(0) when ν˜i(0) is known.
Remark 4.4: From the above two theorems, one sees that
using OPAC algorithm, we have δ = √
3σ
, which is the
optimal privacy that can be achieved from solving problem
(24). Furthermore, δ = √
3σ
can be guaranteed by OPAC
algorithm under I1i (∞). Thus, OPAC algorithm can achieve
much higher (, δ)-data-privacy than the existing PPAC.
1This is the main difference between OPAC and PPAC algorithm, and the
main reason why OPAC can avoid privacy compromission.
V. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we conduct simulations to verify the ob-
tained theoretical results and evaluate the performance of the
proposed OPAC algorithm.
A. Simulation Scenario
Consider the network with 50 nodes which are randomly
deployed in a 100m × 100m area, and the maximum com-
munication range of each node is 30m. We consider the
normal distribution and uniform distribution of the added
noises, respectively, where the mean and variance of them
are set 0 and σ2 = 1. We set % = 0.9. The initial states
of the nodes are randomly selected from [0, 10]. The function,
d(t) = max
i∈V
|xi(t)− x¯|, is defined as the maximum difference
between the nodes’ states and the average value.
B. Verification
Fig. 1(a) compares the convergence speed of the PPAC
algorithm using normal and uniform distribution noises, in
which the basic design is the same as PPAC proposed in [16].
It is observed that under the two different distributions, the
PPAC algorithm has the same convergence speed. This justifies
that the convergence speed only depends on the eigenvalues
of the weighted matrix W and the value of % as proved in
[16].
Fig. 1(b) compares the (, δ)-data-privacy under I0i with
normal and uniform distribution noises. In simulation, we
conduct 10, 000 simulation runs. For each run, one node first
generates a state θi(0) randomly with the given distribution,
and the other node generates 10, 000 random numbers with the
same distribution and use them as the estimation of θi(0) (i.e.,
θˆi(0)). Then, one get the probability of |θˆi(0)− θi(0)| ≤  in
each run, and we use the maximum probability among these in
all runs simulation as the value of δ. For the theoretical results,
we use (23) to calculate the value of δ under two different
distributions. Clearly, one can observe from Fig. 1(b) that
uniform distribution is much better than normal distribution
in the sense of (, δ)-data-privacy. It is also observed that δ in
simulation matches its value in theory.
Fig. 1(c) compares the (, δ)-data-privacy under I1i using
normal and uniform distribution noises. The simulations here
are conducted similarly as those in Fig. 1(b), except that
when the iteration increases, the variance of the noises will
be changed to σ2 = %2k since (40) will be used for estimation
at iteration k. We use (23) to calculate the value of δ, and
the corresponding results are denoted as theoretical results.
Both in simulation and theory, we set  = 0.2. As shown in
Fig. 1(c), the maximum disclosure probability increases with
iteration and will converge to 1, i.e., the privacy decays with
iteration and will eventually be compromised.
C. Evaluation
In this subsection, we will evaluate the performance of the
OPAC algorithm. Using the same setting as the above subsec-
tion, the OPAC algorithm can guarantee the similar privacy
as the blue line shown in Fig. 1(b) under I1i . This is because
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Fig. 1. The convergence and privacy comparison under different random noise distribution.
uniform distribution noise is used in OPAC and the secret
function makes the subsequent (k ≥ 1) information cannot
increase the disclosure probability. Therefore, the OPAC can
guarantee much stronger privacy than the GPAC, since it can
achieve the same data-privacy under I1i as the GPAC under
I0i .
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Fig. 2. The performance evaluation of the OPAC algorithm.
Then, we test the convergence of the OPAC algorithm. Set
Fij =
i+2j
50 . As shown in Fig. 2(a), we find that the nodes’
states will converge to the exact average with the OPAC, which
means that an exact average consensus can be achieved by the
proposed algorithm. Fig. 2(b) compares the convergence speed
of the OPAC and PPAC, it is found that they almost have the
same convergence speed. Hence, added secret function will
not affect the convergence speed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigated the privacy of the GPAC algo-
rithm. We proposed a novel privacy definition, named (, δ)-
data-privacy, to depict the relationship between privacy and
estimation accuracy, so that the degree of the privacy can be
well quantified. We proved that the GPAC algorithm achieves
(, δ)-data-privacy, and obtained the closed-form expression
of the relationship between  and δ. We also proved that the
noise with uniform distribution guarantee a highest privacy
when  is small enough. We revealed that the privacy will
be lost when the information used in each consensus iteration
is available to the other nodes. Then, to solve this problem
and achieve highest (, δ)-data-privacy, we proposed OPAC
algorithm, followed by the convergence and privacy analysis.
Lastly, simulations are conducted to demonstrate the efficiency
of the proposed algorithm.
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